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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost a decade now the American military has been in the throes
of what is known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).' The progeny
of the larger Information Revolution, the RMA describes the impact of
microchip-based technologies-not just on military equipment, but also the
doctrine, organization, and strategies of warfighting. The synergistic effect of
these impacts has led the U.S. armed forces-and especially the Air Force-to
achieve lopsided victories in Iraq, Serbia, and elsewhere.
Paralleling the RMA there is what might be called a Revolution in
Military Legal Affairs (RMLA). In a sense, the RMLA is also much the
product of the same technological changes as those that caused the RMA. As
will be discussed below, advanced communications and other new capabilities
already have significantly altered military legal practice and are poised to
generate even more change in the future. However, technology has stimulated
the velocity of the RMLA in ways beyond merely the mechanics of the
practice of law and the organization and doctrine applicable to legal
professionals.
Technology has made law, and especially the law of armed conflict
(LOAC), a central consideration in modem war. Specifically, international
newsgathering organizations equipped with powerful new communications
capabilities bring the raw images of war-to include possible LOAC
violations-almost instantaneously to publics around the world. Such pictures
can have significant impact in democratic states, as well as nations that-if not
"democracies" in the American sense-are nevertheless dependent upon
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popular support to wage war. Professors W. Michael Reisman and Chris T.
Antoniou explain:
In modem popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a
substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse
itself rapidly, no matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe
that the war is being conducted in an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way. 2

In short, the ability of today's communications systems to transmit
information to the body politic before leaders can censor or shape it has
become one of the most salient features of modem war. In order to maintain
the kind of public support the militaries need to prosecute a war, adherence to
LOAC in fact andperception is essential. Both military and civilian leaders have
come to accept that fighting lawfully is not just the proverbial "right-thing-to-do,"
it is a practical-even Machiavellian-necessity.
This phenomenon is a key stimulus for the RMLA. With lawfulness
becoming more and more the measure of success of a combat operation, there
is a need for professionals who not only know the law, but can apply it
appropriately in that unique context. As discussed below, Air Force judge
advocates (JAGs) and paralegals are filling that requirement in ways
unprecedented less than a generation ago. Unsurprisingly, Air Force legal
professionals were among the first to deploy in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom's war on terrorism. 3 What the RMLA means in real terms is that
today few Air Force commanders would go to war without a JAG. One might
conclude, therefore, that the role of legal professionals is fully institutionalized
within the armed forces and the Air Force especially.
In truth, the status of military lawyers and paralegals in operational
matters is not yet as firmly established as one might expect at this stage.
Despite flattering remarks by commanders and others in a variety of forums,
there remains an underlying resentment if not hostility among many in the
armed forces to the growing presence and, more specifically, the influence of
lawyers in the conduct of modem conflicts. Critiques are not commonly
articulated for the record, but do exist for operations from Desert Storm 4 to
2
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(emphasis added).
3 For information on the Air Force's role in Operation Enduring Freedom see Air Force Link,
Enduring Freedom, available at http://www.af.mil/news/efreedom/index.shtml (last visited
Nov. 12, 2001).
4 See e.g., WILLIAMSON MURRAY, AIR WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF 224-226 (1995)
(criticizing the alleged role of Air Force lawyers with respect to a proposed bombing of a
statue of Saddam Hussein). Murray's version of events is disputed by Colonel Scott L.
Silliman, USAF (Ret.), the former Staff Judge Advocate of what was then known as Tactical
Air Command (TAC). Murray contends that TAC legal advice that the statue was a protected
cultural monument "was simply wrong." Silliman contends that no lawyer ever concluded that
bombing the statue was illegal; lawyers only recommended that the target be carefully
screened for conformance with existing legal standards. He believes the statue was removed
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Allied Force, 5 and have already appeared for Enduring Freedom. 6 As the
significance of law continues to grow in international affairs, we should expect
such appraisals to become more frequent, penetrating, and potentially
antagonistic.
Moreover, despite sporadic references in a number of doctrinal
documents, Air Force legal professionals do not as yet have their own doctrine.
Its absence produces practical, deleterious effects in that commanders and, just
as importantly, planners, have no systemized way of conceptualizing the legal
function into the Air Force's warfighting architecture. They are reduced to
filling the void with ad hoc and idiosyncratic assessments of what is or is not
an appropriate use of legal resources. In combat operations this can result in a
hodgepodge of arrangements that are often personality-driven, and are
therefore-almost by definition-fragile. Though workable solutions are
sometimes stumbled upon, there is a real risk that for any number of reasons,
in some future operations, legal considerations will not get the attention the
exigencies of the RMLA requires. The result could be disastrous for the
mission in a world where public perceptions are as important (and arguably
more important) as battlefield success.
Fortunately, the Air Force does have an energetic effort underway to
create doctrine for legal professionals in the operational arena.7 The purpose
of this essay is not to critique that effort. Instead, it will consider the hardearned experiences of Air Force legal professionals to outline a 'way ahead' in
light of the RMLA. How should we think about the role of JAGs and
paralegals in tomorrow's conflicts? What do we need to do to ensure that
those JAGs and paralegals called upon to perform in future operations have the
type and depth of training they need to succeed? What are the challenges that
will (and, to an extent, already have) emerged in the 2 1st century?
II. THE RISE OF AEROSPACE LAW
As already suggested, the involvement of JAGs and paralegals in
operations is not, per se, especially new. They served in significant numbers
from the target lists for unrelated reasons. E-mail from Scott L. Silliman to Colonel Charles
Dunlap, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Strategic Command (Feb. 19, 1998, 10:20:23 EST) (on

file with author).
5 See e.g., Richard K. Betts, Compromised Command, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jul.-Aug. 2001, at
126, 129-130 (review of WESLEY CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, Kosovo, AND

THE FUTURE OF COMBAT (2001)) (arguing that the role of lawyers in the Balkan air war was
"alarming" and "constrained even the preparation of options" and marked by a lack of
"understanding of operational problems").
6 See Seymour M. Hersh, King's Ransom, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2001 available at
httgp://www.newvorker.com/FACT/?011022fa FACT1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
' The draft doctrine is Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.5 Doctrinefor Legal Support of
Aerospace Operations (draft). This effort is underway at the Air Force Doctrine Center see
http://www.doctrine.af.mil/.
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in Korea, Vietnam, and later at a variety of fixed overseas bases during the
Cold War.8 However, their function was largely confined to traditional support
activities such as military justice, claims, and legal assistance. International
law as practiced in the Air Force at the base level was principally concerned
with foreign criminal jurisdiction, tax matters, and the occasional immigration
issue.
The seeds of the modem concept of JAG operational support are found
in Operation Just Cause, the successful 1989 military effort to oust
Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega. Then Colonel Bill Moorman, the 12 th
Air Force Staff Judge Advocate at the time, arranged to get JAGs into the
operation center as well as the planning cells, all with good effect. 9 Later,
during the Gulf War, JAGs built upon this success and became significant
"players" in such operational matters as the evaluation of targets, the
development of rules of engagement (ROE), 10 and other vital operational
matters.'" Since that time, a growing number of "steady state" deployments of
legal professionals to the Middle East, the Balkans, and occasionally to Asia
and elsewhere continue the tradition begun in the 1980s.
Although not well known today, the architecture and precedent for JAG
deployments after the Gulf War was much the result of efforts by then Colonel
Jim Swanson during his service as the staff judge advocate (SJA) for 9 th Air
Force (1993-96). Colonel (now Brigadier General) Swanson's advocacy for
the inclusion of legal professionals in steady state and contingency
deployments established a template for the Central Command Air Forces
(CENTAF) Area of Operations (AOR).' 2 This is especially significant as
Southwest Asia became among the most common deployment locations for Air
Force legal professionals.
Of particular note is General Swanson's establishment-as a result of
his experiences during Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994-of the SJA
position at Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) as a full-time 0-6
billet. The presence of an experienced senior lawyer in the midst of on-going
combat operations planning and execution educated a generation of senior Air
Force leaders to the contribution a military lawyer can make to mission
8 See generally, "Operations Law" in Office of the Judge Advocate General, THE REPORTER,
Special History Edition, 1999, at 110-157.
9 See Lt Col Terrie M. Gent, The Role of Judge Advocates in a Joint Air OperationsCenter,
AIRPOWER JOURNAL, Sept. 1999, at 40-55 availableat http://www.airpowermaxwell.af.mil
/airchronicles/apj/apj99/spr99/gent.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
'0 See generally, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr. (CJCSI) 3121.01A, Standing Rules of
Engagementfor US Forces (Jan. 15, 2000).
11 See generally, Master Operation Lawyer's Edition, 37 A.F.L. Rev. (1994) (containing
several articles addressing the deployment of legal professionals, as well as the functions they
performed).
This includes much of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. See generally, the U.S.
Central Command website available at http://www.centcom.mil/new site/web/Default.htm
(last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
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accomplishment. It has also provided a cadre of senior JAG leadership with
authentic operational credentials and a keen appreciation of personal and
professional demands occasioned by practicing law in combat zones.
All of this serves to well position the JAG Department to meet the
needs of the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF). 13 Although relatively small in
numbers at any given moment in time, these deployments - along with those
elsewhere - have over time involved a significant number of lawyers and a
smaller but still considerable number of paralegals. From that experience a
number of lessons emerge, not the least of which is that serving at the tactical
level in a wing - where the vast majority of legal professionals find themselves
when deployed - is substantively different than serving in a headquarters, and
The context of the two
especially an air operation center (A0C). 14
the recent separation of
to
warrant
environments is sufficiently different so as
15
the unit type codes (UTCs) to reflect the important differences in the duties to
be performed.
Still, both kinds of duty can be considered under the aegis of
"aerospace law." Traditionally, everything that occurred in the deployed arena
was lumped together as "operations law." At one time that might have been
appropriate; however, as we now work to focus training to meet the bona fide
needs of distinct UTCs, it is necessary to add more fidelity to the lexicon to
accommodate the realities of the RMLA. Properly conceived, "aerospace law"
embraces the entire spectrum of legal activities that in various ways are
directly related to operations, and especially combat operations. Within that
discipline, the wing level function can be characterized as the practice of
"expeditionary law," while serving in an AOC represents engagement in
"operations law."
Clearly, in the EAF, all uniformed legal professionals ought to prepare
to practice expeditionary law. Indeed, one might fairly say that there are three
kinds of JAGs and paralegals today: 1.) those that are deployed; 2.) those that
have deployed; and 3.) those that will deploy. Just as all JAGs are expected to
have basic advocacy skills and be qualified to prosecute and defend courtsmartial, so too must virtually the entire Department be expeditionary-ready.
The same, however, is not necessarily true with respect to operations law. The
requirement for such personnel will never be as large as for those
For a brief summary of the EAF paradigm and its implementing Aerospace Expeditionary
Force structure, see Dep't of the Air Force, America's Air Force Vision 2020 (2000) available
at http://www.af.mil/vision/vision.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
14 For a general discussion of the role of air operations centers in Air Force doctrine, see Dep't
of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Organizationand Employment ofAerospace
Power, Feb. 17, 2000 availableat http://www.doctrine.af.inil/.
15 For more information about JAG and paralegal UTCs as well as AEF deployments, see the
judge advocate portion of the AEF website availableat https://aefcenter.acc.af.mil/AEFC
/functionals/JAlinks.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
16 The Judge Advocate General must certify military lawyers before they perform the defense
counsel function. See UCMJ art. 27(b) (2000).
13
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expeditionary-qualified. Besides the enhanced knowledge of international law
AOC work requires, all persons working in an AOC-to include legal
professionals-need to learn specialized computer and communications
systems. Thus, it simply does not make sense (nor is it feasible) to attempt to
inject that kind of expertise across the Department. That said, there arenevertheless-aspects of each kind of duty warranting further analysis.
III. EXPEDITIONARY LAW
"Expeditionary" law is a traditional "wing-level," comprehensive legal
practice conducted in the deployed environment. In most, but not all, respects
it mirrors the kind of law typically practiced at a continental United States'
(CONUS) base but with some important differences, especially physical ones.
Specifically, the expeditionary law practitioner must be prepared to effectively
function in a sometimes austere and possibly hostile situation. This means that
the legal team must have good physical conditioning and solid airmanship
skills. These would include the ability to set up and maintain living and
working facilities, demonstrated proficiency with the designated firearm, the
capacity to survive and operate in an environment contaminated by
chemical/biological weapons, and more.
Concerning legal personnel, the Department's concept is to deploy a
JAG and a paralegal as a team, and has constructed its principal UTC to that
effect. 17 No one would dispute that training together and building good
working relationships pays dividends when deployed. Nevertheless, it is
important to avoid having the teams become inflexibly idiosyncratic, that is, so
dependent upon each other that the JAG and paralegal who compose it are
unready to function separately should the need arise. Among other things,
UTCs should not be built on the assumption that the respective team members
will compensate for a partner's weaknesses. There may be many instances
where the team is deliberately divided, or unexpected, last minute substitutions
must be made. As important as the "team" concept is and should remain, the
flexibility to rapidly reconfigure as required is an absolute must.
Though there is no consensus on this point, deployed offices are not
necessarily intended to be "full service" affairs; that is, they should not be
expected to do "legal brain surgery" in, for example, a two-person shop that
may represent the total legal presence at a given location. The ratio of
attorneys and paralegals to the deployed population will never match that
found at a CON(US location. Consequently, there must be prioritization and
allocation of resources that might result in certain services simply being
unavailable. Thus, for example, such customarily provided services as the
annual tax program may not exist in many contingency locations.

17

The UTC XFFJ3 is composed of a JAG and paralegal.
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Along these lines, our doctrine (along with other Air Force directives)
needs to reflect the importance of predeployment legal planning. People
cannot be forced to execute wills or powers of attorney, but they can be
educated on the utility of such documents. Furthermore, they ought to be
given ample opportunity to have them prepared in other than the chaos and
pressure of an imminent overseas deployment. The way to accomplish this is
for JAGs to be very proactive during the planned spin-up period for a
designated Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF).18 At some stage each
individual should be counseled by a legal professional concerning potential
issues that could arise while deployed. The member should be provided with
the available options for addressing them.
Perhaps the most difficult, yet exceptionally important, aspect of
expeditionary law is military justice. For many years military justice in the
deployed environment meant little more than the occasional Article 15 or letter
of reprimand. More serious cases (where court-martial was contemplated)
typically resulted in the accused being returned to home station, usually
CONUS. In the late 1990s, however, the legal and command infrastructure in
contingency areas in the CENTAF AOR was sufficiently robust that more than
a dozen cases were tried in-theater.
Philosophically, it is vitally important that the full-range of justice
options, to specifically include trial by court-martial, be available to command
in situ. Few things could be more destructive of morale and discipline than if
the commission of misconduct were to become an avenue out of an arduous
and possibly dangerous location. Although historically, trials have taken place
in combat zones, 19 the rather ill-conceived predilection in recent years to
civilianize the military justice system has taken its toll. Today evidentiary
rules, representational precedents, and other developments meant to mirror the
resources and processes available in CONUS civilian courts have made the
conduct of military trials in remote foreign areas under austere conditions
extremely difficult and sometimes impossible.
The RMLA should extend innovations to the administration of the
disciplinary process at every level. Part of this may require something of a
"back to the future" approach. For example, the typical practice today is to
deploy defense counsel, military judges, and court reporters only when needed
for specific cases. Unfortunately, however well this concept may work for
steady-state deployments (and it is cumbersome and complex at best), it will
seldom work consistently for dynamic, short-notice contingencies. Inserting
unexpected personnel into the intra-theater transportation scheme in a
relatively new operation is difficult and will become even more so as sorties
18 See note 13, supra.
19 During the Vietnam War, a Marine Corps court-martial was conducted in an underground
bunker in the midst of the dramatic siege of Khe Sanh. See GARY D.

SOLIS, MARINES AND

MARINE LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE 106-109 (1989).
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get ever more carefully managed to fully book them with pre-existing
requirements.
One solution may be to make the necessary policy (and statutory if
needed) changes to allow the designation of military lawyers already in-theater
to serve on a temporary basis as military judges and defense counsel.
Admittedly, there would be challenges to ensure that such judges and defense
counsel have sufficient independence in fact, but these issues are manageable.
Further, some may argue that such an approach would undercut the appearance
of impartiality of the judiciary and defense services.
In truth, however, there is virtually no data to demonstrate that the
existing structure ever successfully created the desired perception of
independence among the military's rank and file, or even-for that matteraccused who are presumably briefed in some detail on the elaborate structure
set up for that purpose. The significant numbers of accused that seek civilian
counsel would seem to be a melancholy testament to that conclusion. In other
words, to the typical airman accused of misconduct, the new arrangement
would likely be transparent in terms of his or her expectations. To the
contrary, some accused may prefer representation by counsel drawn from
deployed units because of the anticipated familiarity with the specific area and
mission-compared to the potential negative effect of representation by
outside counsel who lack such familiarity.
Other changes reflective of the technology that underpins the RMLA
ought to be made. For example, evidentiary rules (and statutory underpinnings
where appropriate) that take advantage of such new communications
capabilities such as video teleconferencing are plainly overdue. Inevitably,
such changes would be tested in the courts, but it is a mistake to assume-as is
too often the case today-that they would be rejected. Constitutional standards
applicable to the trials of members of the armed forces for uniquely military
offenses (and those directly related by theirfacts to a specific military mission
in contingency areas during hostile action) may very well permit the use of
advanced communications means as a substitute for live testimony.
The RMLA would also seem to suggest changes in nonjudicial
punishment actions. For example, persons assigned to naval vessels can be
required to accept nonjudicial punishment even when they otherwise might
wish to demand trial by court-martial. 20 An element for this practice lies in the
special status of a ship's captain that comes from naval traditions. In the main,
however, it reflects the logistical problems with trying cases aboard ship
should the respondent refuse nonjudicial punishment. Today, however, the
difficulty of trying such cases in some of the remote locations where an AEF
may find itself will equal-if not exceed-the justification that warranted the
rule for naval vessels in the first place. Thus, it may make sense to extend the
policy to contingency locations under certain circumstances. In short, the
20

10 U.S. C. § 815(a) (1998).
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entire Uniform Code of Military Justice 21 and associated administrative
procedures need re-examination to facilitate its application-and relevance-in
the deployed environment.
The differing. issues presented by the administration of military justice
constitute just one illustration of how "expeditionary" law within the aerospace
law discipline differs from received wisdom of what constitutes "operations
law." Another example that the JAG deploying with the typical AEF will find
is that the expeditionary law practice requires in-depth knowledge of
contracting and fiscal law principles. It has been the universal (albeit
somewhat unexpected) experience of deployed JAGs that these matters present
the thorniest issues. The natural tendency of commanders to make things
happen quickly, the absence of contractors knowledgeable of government
procurement procedures, and differing cultural orientations in host areas, are
just a few of the things that make resolving these issues so difficult. In any
event, addressing contract and fiscal law problems is central to the practice of
the expeditionary law.
Of course, expeditionary law does require a general appreciation for
international law, especially as it applies to status of forces agreements (or the
absence thereof). The JAG must know, for example, the procedure for dealing
with foreign criminal jurisdiction cases, as well as foreign claims. Concerning
operational matters, the JAG should expect to provide rules of engagement
training, along with LOAC instruction as needed. What the wing-level JAG
typically will not do is review targets and operational plans. The vetting of
those issues in-theater is the responsibility of the AOC legal team. Among
other things, the JAG at the wing-level will rarely have access to the overall
plan or the supporting intelligence to make a proper evaluation. However, if
for whatever reason the JAG becomes concerned about a targeting or other
LOAC matter, that concern should be immediately transmitted to the AOC's
JAG cell.
The role of the paralegal in the expeditionary environment finds many
parallels with that of a law office manager. This means the paralegal must be
able to perform the range of tasks accomplished by paralegals in the typical,
full-service wing legal office. Experience reveals, however, some areas worth
special emphasis. For example, the paralegal should be familiar with report of
survey procedures because the loss or damage of property is not uncommon in
deployed areas. The paralegal must also know how to process a Foreign
Claims Act 22 case. As previously mentioned, complicated contracts and fiscal
law issues often arise during deployments. The paralegal should become
expert in the instructions governing the use of appropriated and
nonappropriated funds for health, welfare, and morale purposes. 23 This is
" 10 U.S. C. §§ 801-946 (1998).
22

See Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1998).

See e.g., Appropriated Funds, Op. JAG, Air Force, No. 23, (Apr. 1, 1999) (discussing
appropriate funding sources for commanders' coins).
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another issue that seems to frequently arise in deployed situations, and one
which paralegals could provide great assistance in resolving.
A tremendous opportunity also exists for paralegals in military justice
and other investigatory matters. Beyond the need to be able to fully process all
kinds of military justice actions, it appears that the paralegal in future
operations will need to have court-reporting skills. The Department's current
reliance upon civilian court reporters volunteering as needed continues to be
problematic z 4 and can never provide the certainty those responsible for military
planning demand. The nature of 2 1st century Air Force missions requires a
cadre of uniformed court-reporters who can be directed to go into harms' way
anywhere in the world, and who have the training and physical stamina to
survive and function once there.
A key to developing this aspect of the RMLA is to take advantage of
the new court-reporting technologies. With the right systems, mastering court
reporting will not be the onerous task it has been in the past. Indeed, delays in
court-martial transcriptions throughout the Air Force may be related to reliance
on parochial legacy systems instead of newer, faster ones. Once this
technology-facilitated skill is integrated into the paralegal community, it will
be in demand not just in contingency areas, but at home stations as well.
Empowered paralegals will likely find themselves part of the team supporting
such activities as Accident Investigation Boards (AIBs) and the proliferating
number of commander-directed investigations (CDIs).
With respect to the last topic, it would seem that paralegals are primed
to fill a critical need in contingency locations (as well as home station): that of
investigator. Counter-terrorism and force protection responsibilities have
caused a steady erosion of investigative support from both the Air Force Office
of Special Investigations (AFOSI) and Security Forces (SF) to the point that
today investigative support of routine criminal matters is very much the
exception. Paralegals are already familiar with the legal considerations
involved, and some have learned, ad hoc, investigative techniques (often when
assigned as defense paralegals). With some additional training, paralegals
could be of immense assistance to those assigned to conduct CDIs, as well as
to trial and defense counsel preparing cases for court. In certain instances,
paralegals may themselves be the principal investigators. Clearly, the RMLA
is not just a technological concept, but rather one that seeks to incorporate new
ways of thinking to meet 2 1st century needs.

See e.g., Lt Col Mary Beth Hamey, After-Action Report-OperationSouthern Watch, Oct.
6, 2001, at para 9a(1) ("The major obstacle [to conducting a court-martial] was finding a court
reporter available to travel to the AOR.").
24
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IV. OPERATIONS LAW
As described above, the integration of Air Force legal professionals
into AOC operations is a process that now has some years experience upon
which to draw. Conceptually, the issue is no longer finding an explicit
rationale for access to AOCs and the planning process. Even if JAG support is
not sought by a concerned commander (not likely in the RMLA era) both
international law 25 and U.S. regulations 26 provide ample authority for getting
military lawyers into the process (though more acculturation of planners and
operators in this regard is always desirable). Today's problem is a practical
one: determining exactly where and how to most efficiently and productively
interface in the operational planning and execution process.
What is needed is an agreed upon template that assures and regularizes
JAG input at various points in the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. The precise
methodology for doing so may well be driven by the integration of such
computer systems as the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS),
as well as the nature of the operation itself. It is important, however, that the
importance of human interaction and physical presence not be underestimated.
To the extent possible, JAGs working in AOCs ought to have physical
presence in the strategy division, the Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting
(GAT) shop, among the Major Air Attack Plan (MAAP) developers, and the
Information Operations (1O) shop, as well as the "battle cab" (or its
equivalent).
Obviously, a JAG working in an AOC needs a solid understanding of
the theory of the ATO process, along with the decision support systems that
make it work. This knowledge must be placed in the larger context of
warfighting, particularly at the strategic level. Today's savvy commanders
very often welcome the JAG in the AOC, but they want the JAG to be a
complete military officer. General Hal M. Homburg captured the expanded
expectations in a speech in June of 2001:
[JAGs] need to understand the big picture. I was in the CAOC during Desert
Fox. Who do you think was standing right behind me? It was my JAG. That
person needs to know the law and the rules of engagement, but he or she also
needs to understand
things bigger than just the law. They've got to
27
understand combat.
25

See e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to

the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 82, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) (commonly known as Additional Protocol 1I).
26 See e.g., CJCSI 5810.01A, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program,para. 6(c)(5)

(27 August 1999) (mandating that "all operation plans... concept plans, rules of engagement,
execute orders, deployment orders, policies, and directives are reviewed by the command legal
advisor to ensure compliance with domestic and international law").
27 General Hal M. Homburg, The Importance of Legal Professionals in the Air Force, (June
27, 2001), available at http://www.aete.randolph.af.mil/pa/Librarv/speeches/cc06.htm
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This highlights the importance of professional military education (PME) for
JAGs intending to practice operations law. Rarely would a JAG who has not
completed intermediate service school be suitable to serve in a senior position
on an AOC legal team. What is more is that the RMLA demands that Air
Force legal professionals re-think the concept of "PME." No longer is it
sufficient to assume that completing periodic formal courses is adequate. The
Air Force legal professional must take on the unending responsibility for selfeducation in every aspect of the client's "business." This means studying
military history, world politics and culture, Air Force weapons systems, grand
strategy, the mechanics of combat operations, and much, much more. Unless
the JAG has an understanding of the multiple dimensions of what General
Homburg calls the "big picture," he or she will never truly succeed as a legal
advisor in combat operations.
Unlike the expeditionary law practitioner, the legal professional
practicing operations law must have a thorough understanding of LOAC and
related facets of international law. He or she must also be familiar with the
interpretations given LOAC by such entities as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 28 Because the Air Force will usually
operate within a coalition, understanding which coalition members are parties
to what LOAC agreements is vital. In the context of the RMLA, JAGs
working in AOCs must carefully distinguish between what the law mandates
and what is merely prudent warfighting. For example, striking a particular
target may be legally and morally permissible notwithstanding collateral
damage, yet still not wise strategically in particular circumstances because of
the political consequences. This, once again, underlines the importance of
fully understanding the "big picture."
The AOC JAG also must be forensically adept. He or she must be able
to rapidly and lucidly explain complex legal matters under circumstances of
great stress. This includes the ability to very quickly draft cogent memoranda
on a wide-variety of issues, and prepare equally as sound presentations that are
visually effective. With respect to ROE, the AOC lawyer must not only be the
expert, but also able to instruct operators on its application in a range of
realistic combat situations. Additionally, the JAG will likely be tasked to draft,
or assist in drafting, that part of the special instructions (SPINs) that concern
ROE. Further, when collateral damage incidents do arise, the JAG may be
called upon to marshal the evidence, analyze it, and "make the case" to the
public if necessary. For all these reasons, the skills of the trial practitionerand not necessarily the international law academic-will often be among the
most desired traits of the operations law attorney.
visited Oct. 22, 2001).
28 See e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (13 June 2000) availableat http://www.un.org/icty
/pressreal/nato061300.htm (last visited June 12, 2001).
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How does the paralegal work into AOC operations? While there has
been much written about the role of the JAG in the AOC, rather less has been
discussed about the paralegal's function. This is still an evolving area, but it
seems clear that the paralegal's importance in the AOC will only continue to
grow. The paralegal's role need not, however, necessarily be interchangeable
with that of the lawyer (though sometimes that may be the case). Ideally, it is
a complimentary role, and one that builds on existing skills. Nevertheless, it
will be necessary-just as with the attorneys-for paralegals to develop new
capabilities.
The paralegal must have a working knowledge of the ATO process
marked by a clear understanding of when and how legal analysis is typically
injected. The reason for this is that the AOC paralegal, who must be an
experienced NCO, should be the "triage" director, that is, responsible for
tracking and managing the multiple demands on attorney time. The paralegal
must have a sufficient understanding of international law and other AOC
issues, not to resolve them per se, but to clarify and prioritize them for the
attorneys. The paralegal also needs to be able to re-direct queries as
appropriate, and to quickly assemble the relevant research materials.
In practical terms, the paralegal must have a "hands-on" technical
capability with respect to the AOC computer systems. He or she must be able
to help set up the system, understand its capabilities, and perform basic
maintenance and repairs. In addition, the paralegal must know how to properly
manage classified material, as well as have a substantive understanding of the
foreign disclosure rules applicable to the particular operation. Although the
AOC legal team usually would not be concerned with such combat support
matters as legal assistance or claims, they inevitably arise among AOC
personnel, and smart client relations dictates they be addressed promptly. The
paralegal should be the principal point of contact for these issues, resolve them
where possible (e.g., preparing a simple power of attorney or performing a
notarization), and ensure proper referral to the supporting legal office when
necessary.
The challenge today is to develop the right kind of training programs
for Air Force legal professionals destined to practice operations law in AOCs.
Given the Air Force's stated intention to treat the AOC as a weapons system,
JAGs and paralegals should expect to attend many of the same formal
programs that all AOC personnel must complete. 29 In addition, specialized
training for lawyers and paralegals (already extant within Air Combat
Command) is needed. Air Force legal professionals should expect a testing
and certification regime, though it is vitally important that the ultimate

29 These courses are conducted by the Air Force Command and Control Training and
Innovation Group at Hurlburt Field, FL, see generally http://www2.acc.af.mi11afc2tig/ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2001).
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decision as to who is--or is not-qualified to practice law in an AOC (as well
as anywhere else in the Air Force) be reserved to The Judge Advocate General.
V. REACHBACK AND THE RISE OF THE "VIRTUAL" OFFICE
A key feature of the emerging Air Force way of war is the notion of
"reachback." This is keeping with the idea that the size of the forward
deployed force will be kept as small as possible. Instead of having all the
experts and other specialists go forward, people can remain at home stations
and "participate" via computer, video teleconferencing, and other advanced
communications links. AOCs are already engaged in this kind of high-tech
leveraging of Air Force resources. By replacing people with "reachback"
technology, a "light, lean, and lethal" 30 AOC can deploy much more quickly
and thus begin air operations sooner.
Reachback is also a feature of the RMLA. In a sense, JAGs have been
using reachback for years. The numerous resources available through the
Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE) program bring all
kinds of information and resources to JAG computer terminals everywhere. Of
course, in certain deployed areas the communications "pipe" cannot always
support or sustain access to FLITE (or access to other legal databases).
Consequently, the International and Operations Law Division (HQ USAF/JAI),
the Air Force Judge Advocate General School, and others record more and
more materials onto CDs for ease and reliability of access.
Most significant is the growth of legal cells that are fully staffed during
contingency operations at command posts in rear areas. It is very often the
case that, notwithstanding distance or time zones, the forward-deployed JAG
always has immediate access to another military lawyer, and frequently at
multiple levels of command. In addition to greater access to legal resources in
the rear area, the type of dynamic exchange that can take place among the
lawyers linked in real time by modem communications systems can often solve
problems more quickly and accurately than could a JAG otherwise isolated by
time and distance.
Still, there is a fine line between reachback support and back channel
"stovepipes." Although operators are becoming accustomed to the concept of
reachback, its application to JAG activities is not yet always fully accepted. In
part this is because there is the perception (and one not altogether bad) among
many clients that a good lawyer can handle any issue. Consequently, it is not
always readily understood that assistance in specialized areas of the law is
required. Further, the sensitive nature of JAG business is such that command,
and others, are often reluctant to share the information with higher
30

The Air Force's development of the new AOC concept is part of a broader effort called

Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX). See e.g., http://www.af.mil/news/airman
/1 199/world7.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 01).
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headquarters. By law, JAGs are free to communicate "directly" with each
other without intervention of the chain of command. 3 1 However, as a practical
matter, JAGs need to engage command as to how JAG reachback can help
accomplish the mission most efficiently.
Another aspect of the RMLA is the concept of the "virtual office."
That is, a way of operating whereby the small footprint, forward deployed
legal office has a different kind of relationship with the supporting office at
higher headquarters. Specifically, the forward office would be principally
responsible for serving immediate needs of clients, as well as spotting issues.
When the deployed JAG is confronted with an issue not capable of immediate
resolution, he or she would have the option of shipping it via e-mail, fax, or
other means to a supporting legal office in the rear (usually the numbered Air
Force).
Substantive research, to extend even to draft-opinion preparation when
appropriate, would be accomplished and then re-transmitted to the contingency
location. In other words, unlike the typical relationship in CONUS where the
subordinate office is expected to exhaust their research and analytical
capability before turning for assistance to higher headquarters, the higher
headquarters JAG office itself forms a "virtual" research branch of the
forward-deployed JAG. The creation of "virtual offices" through the
exploitation of emerging communications capabilities will allow the delivery
of very high-quality legal work to even the remotest locations.
VI. HOMELAND DEFENSE
Actually, the newest trend in aerospace law runs somewhat counter to
the expeditionary concept emphasized in the Air Force in recent years. After
the September 11 attacks, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 32 was
rewritten to push "Homeland Defense" to the forefront. The use of military
force in domestic situations has long raised complex legal issues. Since
Colonial times Americans have been suspicious of the threat to liberty
presented by military forces used for internal security purposes.33 As a result,
there are a plethora of statutes-the Posse Comitatus Act 34 foremost among
them-that regulate the military's authority in CONUS to execute the laws.
There are exceptions to these prohibitions,3 5 but they should be read in a
31 10 U.S. C. § 806(b) (1998).

Dep't of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Rep. (Sept. 30, 2001) available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2001).
33 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary
Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 646-653 (1995).
31 18 U.S. C. § 1385 (1998).
35 See generally, Jeffrey D. Brake, Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis
Management: Background and Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Apr. 19, 2001.
32
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limiting fashion--one that recognizes that there are few models in history
where military forces were successfully used in both a domestic policing role
and in an external warfighting mode.
Of particular concern is determining the legal parameters of domestic
intelligence gathering, especially where U.S. citizens are involved.36 The
events of September 11 have, at least in the short term, diminished the once
robust resistance in the public mind to such government surveillance.
Moreover, as the Air Force-along with Americans generally-become more
computer-dependent, cyberterrorism is another type of 2 1st century threat that
mixes law enforcement and national security interests in ways not yet fully
delineated. Nevertheless, significant limitations on the proper role of the
armed forces remain in place-for good reason. It will be especially important
in the coming years for Air Force legal professionals to ensure the letter and
spirit of the restrictions are fully respected in domestic operations.
Such operations may also include CONUS counterair efforts. What is
really unprecedented for the Air Force in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks is not enhanced CONUS air defense per se. Rather, it is the use of
American fighters to possibly shoot down commercial airliners under the
control of terrorists that is wholly unprecedented. Crafting appropriate ROE
and SPINS for such situations is exceptionally challenging. Beyond this
formidable task we should expect to see a multiplication of requests for
support to civil authorities in situations where biohazards are suspected, as
well as consequence management in the event of terrorist attacks having
catastrophic impact. In the worst case scenario, Air Force legal professionals
must be prepared to advise even on such previously unfathomable matters as
martial law.
VII. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Since the horrific events of September 11, 2001 many have expressed
the view that nothing will ever be the same for Americans. In a very real way
this is especially true for the Air Force Judge Advocate General Department.
Already in the midst of the RMLA, the Department now has an abundance of
aerospace law issues of first impression to address. We may be at the
inception of a RMLA even greater than already discussed. In the future, the
need for aerospace law practitioners for both deployed and homeland
operations may require a re-allocation of the Department's resources.
For example, the Department's civilian lawyers may bear increasing
responsibility for "steady state" taskings in specialized legal disciplines like
labor, environmental, privatization, and more. These are areas of law best
36

See e.g., National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401- 441d; the Intelligence Oversight

Act of 1980, 50 U.S.C. § 413; Exec. Order No. 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities, 46 Fed.
Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981).
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addressed by consistent representation over long periods of time. The
uniformed part of the Air Force's legal team must be prepared to focus on
aerospace law issues that by their very nature are peripatetic in scope,
intensity, and duration. A division of labor that recognizes and accepts counsel
availability as a factor in the efficient delivery of legal services may become a
watershed in the RMLA.
For judge advocates, along with other military officers, the greatest
responsibility in coming years may be to temper the emotions of the moment
with reflective, professional advice. We will face opponents who will not
shrink from using any method to inflict harm upon us, however bestial.
Replacing emotionalism (and all the obtuse and undisciplined decisions it can
generate) with the sort of cold fury that is eminently clear thinking and
aggressively rational, may well be one of the most important contributions a
military professional can make in 21' t century conflicts. Only by doing so can
we be assured that the effective use of armed force honors the legal and moral
ideals that the American military exists to defend.
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